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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study investigated government and community responses to water crises in three rural 
communities in Newfoundland and Labrador- Flat Bay, Black Tickle, Labrador and Steady 
Brook with the first two being Indigenous communities. Using a qualitative approach, we 
interviewed community leaders, volunteer water operators, and provincial government officials. 
The study made use of two different interview schedules to elicit the required responses using 
primarily close- and open ended questions. The study reveals that the term “water crisis’ is 
defined differently by each community and shaped by specific experiences of water insecurity; 
meanwhile, community definitions contrast with the provincial government’s restrictive 
definition. The study establishes that each of the communities has experienced water crisis 
relating to contamination, infrastructure, water shortages, and/or weather. Limited local 
capacities coupled with aging infrastructure are the major challenges that hinder the 
communities’ effective response to drinking water crises. Decentralization approaches to water 
policy has resulted in local communities being responsible for the management of drinking water 
systems; this is problematic and inappropriate for rural communities. Proposed long-term 
solutions include broader definitions of the term water crisis; development of a comprehensive 
provincial wide water management plan; the creation of community- or region-specific water 
emergency preparedness plans; the provision of adequate financial resources and consultation 
and participation of communities through the establishment of multi-level water management 
committees.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background of the Report 
 
This primarily qualitative study took place over a one-year period, from 2015 to 2016, as per the 
funding guidelines of the Harris Centre - RBC Water Research and Outreach Fund, and 
encompassed three case studies with the aim of developing a detailed picture of different 
responses on the part of communities and the provincial government to drinking water crises in 
rural communities.  
 
Two communities are located on the west coast of Newfoundland. Steady Brook is near the 
larger service centre of Corner Brook and might be considered a bedroom community, although 
it has its own water supply. Flat Bay is more remote, located some 10km from the nearest town, 
St. George’s, also a rural community. The third community, Black Tickle, is in Labrador; it is a 
very isolated island community with seasonal sea links but no road connections or regular air 
service. Like Flat Bay, which has a Mi’kmaq population, Black Tickle is an Indigenous 
(Southern Inuit) community. Because Black Tickle is part of the unresolved land claim of 
Indigenous organization – NunatuKavut Community Council – community issues and 
jurisdictions fall to the province. Although most people in Flat Bay are status Indians under the 
Indian Act and members of the Newfoundland and Labrador umbrella band, Qalipu Mi’kmaq 
First Nation, their community is not a reserve so, here, the provincial government plays the same 
role it does in non-Indigenous communities. 
 
Each of the study communities has a different governance system. Steady Brook is a 
municipality, Black Tickle is a local service district (LSD), and Flat Bay is an unincorporated 
community. However, Flat Bay has a water committee that is actively supported by the local 
non-Indian Act Flat Bay Band. These are all very small rural communities with populations 
ranging from approximately 140 (Black Tickle) to 400 (Steady Brook). Other specific 
community characteristics are discussed in subsequent sections. 
 
Local Service Districts (LSD) are established (through Local Service District Regulations under 
the Municipalities Act, 1999) to provide certain services to communities or areas that have 
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similar needs within a geographic zone.  LSDs are limited to seven main categories of services 
including the provision of potable water. The LSD Committee may, under section 649 of the 
Municipalities Act, 1999, charge a fee for the cost of service or supply provided. Fees may vary 
among residents or users and are set by elected committees. A municipality includes a town, 
village, resort village, rural municipality, municipal district or restructured municipality. In the 
absence of any such governance structure, there may be a local water committee, sometimes 
established on an ad hoc basis in response to crises or concerns. 
 
1.2 Project Background  
1.2.1 Rationale  
 
We began our work with a rights-based approach. According to the United Nations, the human 
right to water is not something to be earned or deserved but a right related to human health. The 
human right to water was formally affirmed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 
2010, making it equal to all other human rights and legally binding and enforceable in existing 
human rights treaties (Gerlak and Wilder, 2012: 8). While many communities and advocacy 
organizations around the world cite this right, the disconnect between legal national and 
international frameworks and local initiatives and projects is too great to effectively address 
water insecurity. As Gerlak and Wilder assert, “a human right to water does not fit well with the 
messy struggles of ensuring access to water and sanitation on the ground” (2012: 14). This is 
something we wanted to explore through the study. Thus, we recognize this right and operate 
from the basis of this recognition. We understand, however, that the rights argument can identify 
power relationships but it cannot alter them; it has real-world limitations.   
 
Indigenous rights are another reference points for us as researchers as two of the three 
communities in this study are Indigenous. Black Tickle, Labrador is a Southern Inuit community 
while Flat Bay is Mi’kmaq. The treaty and Indigenous rights of the First Nations, Inuit and Metis 
of Canada, including those of this province, are affirmed in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, Articles 1 and 2 (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2010). Thus, 
Indigenous people have the right to live on and enjoy the land of their ancestors which includes 
consistent access to potable water. We note that Indigenous people are aware of the benefits of 
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being engaged in scientific research, especially as these relate to improvements at the local level 
(Cruikshank, 2004). 
 
Drinking water is obviously necessary for human life and good quality drinking water in 
sufficient quantities is necessary for human health. Water insecurity causes mental stress and, 
potentially, health problems (Hanrahan et al., 2015). Besides being a health concern, drinking 
water has implications for community and regional development, an ongoing issue in this 
province. Drinking water challenges can prevent other forms of development in communities; as 
residents of Black Tickle have pointed out in previous studies, it is impossible to open a bed and 
breakfast or a restaurant without consistent access to potable water (Sarkar et al., 2015). Thus, 
water insecurity impedes community development and regional development. Entrepreneurship 
and employment are hampered because of this lack of basic infrastructure. Business ideas cannot 
come to fruition, which represents lost opportunity. These issues regularly appear in the NL 
media with some communities frequently losing access to safe drinking water due to, for 
example infrastructure problems, and other communities enduring long-term boil or chronic boil 
water advisories (BWAs) (Minnes and Vodden, 2014). A BWA is defined as “a preventative 
measure to protect public health from confirmed or suspected microbial or chemical 
contamination” (Patrick, 2011) and is an appropriate emergency response to drinking water 
contamination, although it should not be the only measure (Timmer et al., 2007). All these, and 
other related, situations have adverse effects. 
 
1.2.2 Objective(s)  
 
Study objectives were as follows: 
 
• To identify communities that experienced drinking water crises in 2014 
• To determine how “drinking water crisis” is understood and defined by government and 
by the communities 
• To identify existing relevant policy as well as gaps 
• To provide a detailed account of each of the three responses to drinking water crises 
• To discern patterns and identify discrepancies 
• To measure the responses against existing relevant government policy 
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• To obtain different perspectives on the responses from government and communities 
and 
• To provide analysis and offer recommendations 
 
It is our hope that our recommendations will have applicability in this province and perhaps 
elsewhere so that community and government responses to drinking water crises are consistent, 
appropriate, and comprehensive. Further, we also want to shed light on the need for preventative 
measures so that the number and severity of drinking water crises in rural and remote NL 
decline. 
 
2.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH  
 
The research adopted a case study approach based on qualitative methods. The case study 
approach pays attention to a particular area of concern by considering the various issues and 
thoroughly reporting them. The case study approach is also used when the research requires 
relevant evidence from the chosen geographical location (Rowley, 2002). The study therefore 
covered communities that have experience with water-related challenges. We began with a 
review of relevant information on the NL Water Resources Portal and the media inventory of the 
NL Rural Drinking Water Project. Our search of the media inventory identified rural 
communities that had experienced noteworthy challenges related to drinking water in 2014 and 
2015.  
 
The review of media reports allowed us to develop a sense of the types of drinking water 
problems that occur in rural NL and then to proceed with a definition of ‘crisis’ in this context.  
We conducted a review of relevant government documents, including legislation, pertaining to 
the governance and management of drinking water systems in this province. Specifically, we 
found the following acts useful: The Municipal Affairs Act 1995 and the Municipalities Act 1999; 
the Environmental Protection Act 2002; and the Water Resources Act 2002.  
 
Using google scholar and other databases, two MA Environmental Policy students conducted an 
extensive review of the relevant academic literature (see selected bibliography) to help explain 
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and contextualize our findings and observations. Keywords and terms included: water 
crisis/crises, water insecurity, water shortages, and others. 
 
In terms of primary research, we designed two interview schedules, one for community leaders 
and one for government officials (see appendices). These consisted of mainly open- but also 
close-ended questions. We carried out interviews with four community leaders (two in Flat Bay 
and one elected leader in each of Black Tickle and Steady Brook), which lasted between one and 
two hours each. One of our community interviewees is a volunteer drinking water operator. The 
Black Tickle interview was conducted by phone by the primary investigator (PI) who has a long-
term relationship with the community. We conducted in-person interviews with three 
government officials (two in Corner Brook and one in St. John’s) from the Department of 
Municipal Affairs (MA, then Municipal and Intergovernmental Affairs, MIGA). These 
interviews lasted one and a half hours each and were recorded through note-taking or were 
audiotaped and then transcribed. We asked officials from the Department of Environment and 
Conservation (ENVC) in St. John’s to take part in interviews but the Department elected to do an 
email interview instead with several participants and submitted this to the study. Some of the 
interviews were attended by a Master of Environmental Policy Student as well as the PI. 
 
2.1 Clearances  
 
Because our study involved human subjects, we applied for and received clearance from the 
Grenfell Research Ethics Board. We also received clearance from NunatuKavut Community 
Council. The Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland have yet to develop research ethics processes but we 
followed the guidelines of Chapter Nine of the Tri-Council Policy Statement II. 
 
3.0 THE DRINKING WATER CONTEXT 
 
Water security is best understood through the consideration of these variables: drinking water 
access, availability, quality, and preference (Goldhar et al., 2013). This perspective, developed 
through a study in Nunatsiavut, Labrador builds on the 2000 World Water Council definition 
which stated that water security means “ensuring that freshwater, coastal and related ecosystems 
are protected and improved; that sustainable development and political stability are promoted; 
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that every person has access to adequate safe water at an affordable cost to lead a healthy and 
productive life; and that the vulnerable are protected from the risks of water-related hazards” 
(cited in Goldhar et al., 2013). Goldhar et al. go on to explain the concept of a drinking water 
system (DWS) to better understand water security at the community level: “It encompasses 
components of: i) access to water (including affordability); ii) availability of water (supply and 
distribution); iii) quality of water; and iv) preference of water” (464-465). When any element of 
the DWS is stressed, water security is threatened in a community (Goldhar et al., 2013, 464-
465). 
 
Availability and access to quality drinking water and being able to choose in terms of preference 
for water is key to a successful development strategy (Reid and Vogel, 2006). Availability and 
access to quality drinking water also has significant positive health impacts and improves the 
lives of the poor globally (Reid and Vogel, 2006). Water security has been given a serious 
recognition so much that one of the main United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) focused on reducing the proportion of people without adequate access to affordable 
water by half by 2015 (UN, 2000). Goal six of the current Sustainable Development Goals also 
aims at achieving clean water and sanitation stressing how significant it is to give prominence to 
water security. DWS therefore recognizes that dealing with water security requires a shift in 
thinking beyond just water availability and access to more complex issues of variable water 
quantity and quality (Mukheibir, 2010). 
 
Globally there is a trend towards delegating water governance to the community level as a means 
of improving efficiency, access and sustainability; many watershed projects in the United States 
serve as examples of this (Norman et al., 2012). This represents a shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ in which there are increased roles and responsibilities in environmental 
management for community leaders and members (Norman et al., 2012, 53). This is particularly 
true of Canada, which is one of the most decentralized countries in the world (Bakker and Cook, 
2011). The Canadian constitution delegates water and land management powers to the provinces 
(Robins, 2007) with water fixed to territorial scales for the purpose of water management 
(Norman et al., 2012). Further, “Canada’s highly decentralized approach to water governance 
creates challenges and has had negative impacts on its ability to manage water resources 
effectively” (Bakker and Cook, 2011, 275-276). Increasingly, these responsibilities are devolved 
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to junior governments and communities, representing “administrative decentralization” or 
“democratic decentralization,” which fails to take the need for capacity-building into account 
(Robins, 2007, 3). Decentralization cannot work unless local organizations have sufficient 
resources to enact responsibilities (Ananda and Proctor, 2013).  
 
There is no clear authority for water governance in Canada (Bakker ad Cook, 2011) and the 
country’s water quality guidelines are non-enforceable (Kot et al., 2011). According to NL’s 
ENVC, “a drinking water system should be designed to provide 340 L/p/d (litre per person per 
day). World Health Organization [WHO] guidelines indicate that adults need approximately 4.5 
L/day of water. Up to 20 L/p/d should ensure basic hydration, hygiene, and food hygiene needs 
according to the WHO” (WHO guidelines are cited in van der Zaag, 2004). Provincial 
governments have oversight functions but it is mostly municipal authorities that assume 
responsibility for safe drinking water (Kot et al., 2011), as holds true for NL with the caveat that 
even small communities that are not municipalities assume this responsibility. Because of 
problems associated with water governance in Canada, there are growing concerns about water 
security in Canada, especially in Indigenous communities where BWAs are 2.5 times more 
frequent and water-borne infections 26 times higher than non-Indigenous communities (Patrick, 
2011, 386).  
 
4.0 LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE 
 
4.1 Capacity 
 
Capacity is a core concern for drinking water in rural Newfoundland and Labrador. Capacity can 
be defined as “the ability of an organization to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently 
and sustainably” (De Loë et al., 2002). It has four dimensions: financial, social, technical and 
institutional (Rawlyk & Patrick, 2013). Financial capacity is the ability to generate and access 
adequate funding as well as the ability to adapt to changing circumstances (Timmer, et al., 2007, 
190).  
 
In Newfoundland and Labrador, many rural communities are not municipalities but local service 
districts (LSDs) or unincorporated communities run by volunteers with limited ability to raise 
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funds. Weak governance structures have implications for drinking water security. Rural 
communities in Canada have weak capacity in terms of complying with drinking water 
regulations; this constitutes a heavy burden (Kot et al., 2011). Rural communities, such as those 
taking part in this study, are also hampered by aging populations with the result that “the 
capacity of these communities to deliver essential services is at risk” (Kot, et al., 2011, 1031).  
 
Limited local capacity sometimes means local governments might be “less proactive” in 
protecting drinking water sources and instead make unwise decisions, such as investing in 
expensive technologies (Rawlyk and Patrick, 2013, 22).  
 
4.2 Linkages 
 
Linkages are connections to other organizations and groups, with vertical linkages involving 
senior governments, such as the province or band councils, and horizontal linkages pertaining to 
other municipalities and communities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
provincial government sees horizontal linkages as an appropriate response to water crises. 
Specifically, it sees a role for NGOs in water crisis responses: “Not on a daily basis. But NGOs 
are a big part of emergency responses. For example, the Red Cross usually provides communities 
in water crises with bottled water. Also, different churches would help, too.”  In the case of NL, 
horizontal linkages extend to the media, as we shall see. Canada’s and NL’s decentralized 
approach to water governance means that vertical linkages can be under-developed: communities 
lack oversight, leadership and, at times, assistance from senior governments (De Loë, et al., 
2002). Strong vertical and horizontal linkages are crucial for municipalities and LSDs with 
limited capacity and supports. Without these linkages, water security would be even more 
precarious. 
 
5.0 PROJECT DETAILS AND RESULTS  
 
5.1 Identifying Drinking Water Crises in Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
Our first task was to develop an understanding of drinking water problems in rural NL in 2014-
2015 and to develop a definition of ‘crisis’ in this context. Our search of the media inventory 
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identified many rural communities that had experienced drinking water crises in the relevant 
time period. Each case belongs in at least one of these categories: contamination; water 
shortages; infrastructure; or weather. In each case, at least one component of the DWS was 
compromised ̶ quality, access, availability and preference ̶ causing water insecurity. We note that 
government recognizes the extent of these problems: said one interviewee, “A lot of 
communities have water quality problems.” The following provides specific details under each 
of the categories. 
 
Contamination (impacting DWS quality in particular): 
• On New World Island, Notre Dame Bay dozens of private wells were found to have had 
levels of arsenic exceeding Health Canada's maximum levels 
• Cartwright, Labrador experienced high levels of THMs and discolouration with both 
attributed to engineering flaws in the water system; system upgrades were announced by 
the provincial government 
 
Water shortages (impacting DWS access and availability): 
• Hopedale, the capital of Nunatsiavut in Labrador, issued a state of emergency as there 
was not enough water in the community's reservoir, which was built to accommodate 200 
people while the town has grown to almost 700; infrastructure improvements were made, 
although, for two dozen households, the crisis lasted over a month 
• Fortune, on the Burin Peninsula, cut off the water supply to Grand Bank due to lack of 
rainfall 
 
Infrastructure (impacting DWS access and availability): 
• Grand Bank’s (Burin Peninsula) system was inoperable for five years due to aging 
infrastructure, forcing the community to rely on neighbouring Fortune 
 
Weather (impacting DWS access, availability and preference): 
• Goose Cove on the Great Northern Peninsula lost its water supply during a storm in 
February and again in November - the town expand reservoir capacity by redeveloping its 
existing dam. 
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• Main Brook, also on the Great Northern Peninsula, lost its water supply when power to 
its pump house was cut off during a storm. 
 
Many communities in rural Newfoundland and Labrador are on BWAs for extended periods of 
time or on and off for many years. For instance, in 2014 Milton, near Clarenville, was on a BWA 
for over a decade until upgrades were made. Upgrades are extremely expensive, especially on a 
per capita basis and especially for a small province facing an extremely difficult financial 
picture. The cost for Hopedale was estimated to be $600,000; for Grand Bank, costs were 
$407,000; and for Cartwright, the total was $205,000. Even with 90-10 cost share agreements 
with the provincial government, upgrades can be very difficult and even impossible to afford.  
 
5.2 Definition of Crisis 
 
One of our findings was that communities define crisis differently than does the provincial 
government; in turn, communities define crisis differently than each other. In addition, the 
definition of crisis varies slightly from one government department to another. 
 
In the case of communities, definitions depend on community circumstances and recent lived 
experience. Steady Brook’s water crisis consisted of recurrent and prolonged BWAs leading to 
reduced water consumption and the consumption of possibly contaminated water; as an 
interviewee said, “there’s an old saying you know that familiarity breeds contempt but we’ve 
been on boil orders so long now that people don’t pay any attention to it.” In such cases, BWAs 
become the norm (Patrick, 2011). Another result of recurrent BWAs  ̶  and associated 
perceptions about water quality in Steady Brook  ̶  is the threatened closure of several local 
businesses that lack the reliable drinking water access they depend on. Conflict between the 
municipality, including staff and elected councilors, and business was intense and ongoing, 
causing a great deal of stress to those involved. Tensions were such that they were reported in the 
Western Star, the regional daily newspaper, and other local media. While the crisis in Steady 
Brook was not of the order of the crises in Black Tickle and Flat Bay, it gained a great deal of 
media attention because business owners, a high status influential group, voiced their concerns.  
 
In the case of Black Tickle and Flat Bay, a water crisis means complete loss of access to potable 
water, sometimes lasting for weeks. These crises resulted in reduced drinking water consumption 
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and the consumption of possibly contaminated water from unmonitored water sources like 
springs. Although the study communities differ in many respects, especially socio-economically 
with Steady Brook incomes much higher than those of the other study communities, in all cases 
decreased access to potable water has the same effects, with possible health implications. 
Furthermore, when defining crisis, none of the communities factored in the reasons for their 
particular crisis; they were much more concerned with its effects.  
 
As stated, the provincial government has no standard definition of drinking water crisis. As one 
official told us, different departments have different definitions. According to ENVC, “In 
general, we would treat any incident that threatens water quality or quantity as a possible 
emergency situation, but there are varying levels to this.” Factors that are considered include:  
• the duration of the event 
• the possibility of contamination and 
• the presence of acute health effect risks and whether or not it is a reoccurrence 
MIGA looks at similar factors including:  
• the scale, meaning the number of people and the proportion of community impacted;  
• the time of the year 
• a community’s location and 
• “the urgency” of the water issues 
 
Said one official, “I guess in the strict sense a crisis would be a town that has either no water or 
has a situation whereby a town or community has a non-consumption order in place.” This last 
understanding of crisis puts Steady Brook in the crisis category for one-third of the year but there 
are conflicting views on this; as another interviewee said, “. . .unless the situation is having a gas 
or oil spill or contamination, then it is not an emergency situation.” 
 
Note that some of these decision factors disadvantage rural communities; for instance, the scale, 
which refers to the number of people impacted. Black Tickle has a population of only 140, which 
may make it susceptible to being ignored. On the other hand, the remote location of Black Tickle 
should make its water crises a priority since water cannot be obtained from neighbouring 
communities. All three of the study communities meet ENVC’s criteria: duration, possible 
contamination, and health impacts. 
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While it appears that there is some mutual understanding of drinking water crises between 
communities and government, there is a crucial difference that has real world repercussions. A 
source water quantity problem is generally considered to be a crisis, triggering a swift response 
from the provincial government. According to ENVC, “If the issue is with the source not having 
enough water (e.g., intake frozen, well has run dry, water level in reservoir dropped, etc.) this is 
typically considered more of a critical issue and there will be some level of government response 
(e.g., shipping in bottled water, development of an emergency water supply).” On the other, if 
the problem originates with the treatment or distribution system, such as leaks or inoperable 
valves, “This is considered more of an operational issue for the community.” In such cases, 
government provides technical assistance and possibly emergency funding for repairs. Clearly, 
source water quantity problems, while considered to be community-level responsibilities, are 
seen as much more of a priority in terms of provincial government responses than are 
infrastructure problems, which are considered to be community-level responsibilities. Thus, the 
origin of a water problem is a criterion in determining and shaping government response. 
Further, communities do not understand this distinction which leads to perceptions of 
favouritism and discrimination and a sense of injustice. And sometimes water crises are rooted in 
factors other than source water problems. 
 
5.3 The Role of Government 
 
In line with the downloading of responsibilities and administration, also known as the move from 
government to governance, the NL government restricts its roles regarding drinking water. 
ENVC rationalizes this as follows: “Drinking water safety is an area of multi-facet responsibility 
where each player has its own responsibilities and accountability. . . The community is expected 
to assume ownership and demand a solution.” This means that a significant burden falls to 
communities. Some financial assistance is available for municipalities and LSDs through the gas 
tax. Communities are required to demonstrate good financial management to secure funds. 
MIGA expects LSDs to collect fees for the water services provided by drinking water operators, 
instead of allowing this work to be done by volunteers (“[Using volunteers] is a problem,” said 
one official). The government’s preference is that communities pay hourly wages to drinking 
water operators to sustain operations. On the other hand, the provincial government gives annual 
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awards to volunteer water operators, thus encouraging the practice of volunteer water systems 
management. 
 
MIGA is the lead department when drinking water crises occur while Fire and Emergency 
Services (FES, Government of NL) is the lead agency. According to the officials we interviewed, 
MIGA’s mandate is “to advise and supply capital funding, to look after daily issues regarding 
particular situations (pump, booster system, leaks, and pressure station), to make suggestions and 
(offer) guidance, to provide technical assistance, make site visits, (and to) provide advice (on) 
how to make request of annual municipal capital works.” MIGA sees its role as one of oversight 
and “keeping communities on task with a long-term focus.” The department encourages towns to 
conserve water and measure water, electricity, and chlorine consumption levels, and to identify 
and monitor leaks. But at present there is no regulation requiring communities to monitor and 
report consumption levels: “government doesn’t have any conservation plan in place; (we) only 
deal with (water shortages) on a case by case basis.” 
 
Other departments are involved in water crises responses as well. In the case of a waterborne 
disease outbreak the Department of Health and Community Services (H&CS) follows emergency 
response actions from their Disease Control Manual (2013). ENVC issues environmental 
approvals, samples chemical and physical water quality, maintains a web portal for drinking 
water quality data and provides training to water operators. Advanced Education and Skills 
(AES) is responsible for emergency water distribution, often working closely with the Red Cross 
and/or other NGOs or community organizations such as churches. There are no provincial set 
guidelines for the provision of bottled water during an emergency, although, according to ENVC, 
national guidelines are used. There is, according to interviewees from government, “a fairly high 
degree of cooperation” between departments in terms of crises response and there have been 
successes such as the permanent resolution to the water supply crisis in Hopedale, Labrador in 
2014. As one official explained, “Communications and coordination means success. Different 
departments have different mandates. FES staff in different regions will report on crisis. ENVC 
has staff to provide short term relief. Once water has been restored, ENVC and most other 
agencies will step back. But MIGA will still be there to ensure long term recovery such as 
infrastructure construction.” 
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Rather than having set drinking water emergency policy, the provincial government has typical 
procedures that it follows in the case of a critical situation. According to ENVC, “The response 
to a community water shortage depends on the case by case circumstances. There is no one 
response fits all approach.  The situation needs to be assessed, and corrective actions determined 
from there.”   
 
Municipalities are required to have Emergency Response Plans under the Emergency Services 
Act administered by MIGA. LSDs do not have this requirement but there are similar 
expectations: “generally, communities need to keep a buffer in (their) budget for emergencies; 
they should plan for the unexpected events and ensure adequate funding; (they) should charge 
enough for the unexpected, for example, to fix a pump.” There is also an expectation in 
government that communities develop emergency protocols so they can respond to water crisis; 
this places further demands on communities and requires a certain level of human capacity. 
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5.4 Study Communities 
 
Table 1: Demographic Information 
 
 Flat Bay Steady Brook Black Tickle Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
(Province) 
Population 
Population in 2006 255 435 201 505,469 
Population in 2011 229 408 168 514,536 
2006 to 2011 population 
change  
-10.2% -6.2% -16.4% 1.8% 
Total private houses 100 207 79 250,275 
Private houses occupied by 
usual residents 
92 160 58 208,842 
Population density per 
square kilometer 
51.7 334.8 17.8 1.4 
Age Characteristics 
Population aged 15 and 
over 
88.1% 83.6% 85.1% 85.1% 
Median age of the 
population 
46.9 46.3 39.5 44.0 
Median age of death N 81 67 78 
Marital Status 
Total population 15 years 
and over by marital status 
200 340 140 437,910 
Married or living with a 
common-law partner 
55% 70.6%  64.3%  62.4% 
Not married and not living 
with a common-law 
partner 
45% 27.9%  35.7%  37.6% 
Family Types 
Total number of census 
families in private 
households 
75 130 60 159,385 
 
Total children in census 
families in private 
households 
65 120 50 140,940 
 
0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 Average number of 
children at home per 
census family 
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Household Characteristics 
Average number of 
persons in private 
households 
2.6 2.5 2.8 2.4 
Total number of persons 
aged 65 years and over in 
private households 
13.3% 17.3% 8.8% 15.1% 
Source: Statistics Canada. 2012 
 
 
Figure 1: Study Communities 
Source: Myron King, Environmental Policy Institute, 2016 
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Located in Western Newfoundland some nine kilometres off the Trans-Canada Highway, Flat 
Bay has piped chlorinated water from an artisan well, which is 190 feet deep. The source water is 
a large body of water that has been determined to be more than ample for the local population, 
about 250 people. The source water in Flat Bay is protected as the pump house is secure. There is 
no paid water operator in Flat Bay; the community relies on a small number of volunteers who 
serve on the Flat Bay West-Birchy Bay Water Committee, engaging in a range of activities 
related to drinking water. One individual received the 2016 Volunteer Water Operator of the Year 
Award. Flat Bay also just recently received a regional water operator shared with other towns.  
 
As stated, Flat Bay is not a LSD or municipal government but its water committee is supported 
by a non-Indian Act band. With strong leadership, the band is very active and initiates and 
sponsors many community and regional activities such as annual powwow and a new health 
initiative that extends beyond community boundaries. 
 
A drinking water crisis occurred in Flat Bay West and adjacent Birchy Bay in 2015 when aging 
infrastructure broke down, leading to a complete absence of potable water the entire summer in 
Birchy Bay; the crisis had a shorter duration in Flat Bay. According to one interviewee, “The 
system was 35 years old (and) not built with good material. Everything was done as cheap as 
possible. During the past 10 years, there were more and more problems with constant 
breakdowns every year. (We) repaired leaks voluntarily. (One committee member) hurt his back. 
It was very expensive for (us to get) a back digger but we managed to pull it off. It then hit the 
crisis stage in the spring of 2014. Everything started leaking. Everybody (in Flat Bay West) lost 
water for three days at one point.” Nearby, Birchy Bay, dependent on the same system, had no 
water for a full two months. Although the Red Cross distributed water during this time, at least 
some people decided to collect water from unmonitored springs and other sources, reflecting the 
preferences dimension of Drinking Water Systems. 
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Figure 2: Water Service Line for Flat Bay West and Birchy Brook 
Source: Myron King, Environmental Policy Institute, 2016 
 
There was a long-term resolution of the problems in Flat Bay West-Birchy Bay. It involved 
infrastructure improvements provided through government funding buoyed by a loan from the 
band council. Two provincial government ministers visited the community, including the district 
Member of House of Assembly. Flat Bay was offered a 90-10 grant: “We had to come up with 
10%. It was not easy. Nobody would give it to us. So the band council kicked in. $175,000 was 
the initial phase, we had to come up 10% of that. We had to get two loans at $14,000 and 
$11,800 for each community (Flat Bay West and Birchy Bay). Thank god for the band council. 
We would have been in trouble.” 
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Volunteer labour was also central to the resolution as was the media. As an interviewee 
explained, “CBC [the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation] came (here). They heard (about it) 
through the grapevine. Someone called from the community. They (CBC) called me for an 
interview. What better way to get our message across? After the water went down, this all played 
a role in getting action.” This horizontal linkage – to the media – is something that each of the 
three study communities valued and relied on. 
 
People in Flat Bay also appreciated vertical linkages – to senior governments, in this case the 
band council and the provincial government. Flat Bay enjoys skilled longstanding Indigenous 
leadership with this vertical linkage well-developed. In turn, the band council had, during the 
study, a well-developed relationship with key agents in the provincial government, including the 
local MHA who was also a cabinet minister; the band council was able to leverage this 
relationship. This minister brought colleagues to the community during the crisis and to work 
with them to secure the necessary resources to resolve the crisis for the long-term. 
 
An interviewee’s assessment of Flat Bay’s story includes a compelling point: “We give two 
thumbs up for what government done for us because of the crisis. But if there was no crisis or if 
we were asking for upgrades, they wouldn’t look at us.” As he points out, although the provincial 
government is good at responding to drinking water crises, there is little emphasis on providing 
local communities with the resources and capacity building they need to prevent such crises. 
 
Steady Brook is a municipality with the mayor and councilors receiving an honorarium of 
$4000 and $3000 annually respectively. The town has a gravity-feed system with piped 
chlorinated water. According to the interviewee, the infrastructure is aging and BWAs are in 
effect in the community approximately one-third of the year. Steady Brook had five BWAs in 
2015 and four in 2014. The most recent BWA caused solely by water quality was in 2010 (CBC 
Feb. 18, 2016). At times weather is another cause of BWAs: “In rainy seasons we get a lot of 
runoff -- mainly in the spring you get all the junk washing out on high water and it plays havoc 
with our chlorine system because of the fact that it’s runoff and we can’t keep up with it. If we 
get a massive rain storm the system just the system goes overloaded. (Then) we got to go on boil 
order.”  
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It is often some while before BWAs can be lifted as this action must be taken by H&CS. 
According to an interviewee, “(This) can be a lengthy process given the large region served by 
inspectors.” He estimated that one of Steady Brook’s BWAs was in effect three weeks longer 
than necessary in 2015 for this reason. This exasperated local business owners who could not 
provide fresh water to their customers. According to a member of council, “I am taking it at the 
present time (during a BWA) - a very big lot of personal abuse (that)I do not deserve. Our town 
clerk is taking abuse from the same people that she does not deserve.” 
 
Source water protection (SWP) is a planning process that aims to prevent contamination of 
untreated water at the source (Rawlyk and Patrick, 2013) and is required for drinking water 
safety (Timmer, et al., 2007). SWP requires well-developed technical, institutional, financial and 
social capacity (Rawlyk and Patrick, 2013). From secondary literature documentation it would 
seem that Steady Brook should have a great deal of capacity for SWP (Government of NL, 2014; 
Hearn, 2005; Hearn, 2007; Minnes, 2014). Steady Brook is one of five towns in the province that 
has a watershed management committee and one of three towns with a watershed management 
plan (Government of NL, 2016). In fact, a document released by the Government of NL entitled 
“A Municipal Guide to the Development of a Watershed Management Plan” was based on the 
experience of Steady Brook and its creation of their watershed management plan (Hearn, 2007). 
Steady Brook was even profiled in the Drinking Water Safety in Newfoundland and Labrador 
2014 Annual Report, where it was highlighted as a town where, “government, the public, and 
industry can work together to safeguard our water resources for future generations” (Government 
of NL, 2015, 16). However, it has been indicated by an interviewee that, in practice, the 
Protected Public Water Supply Area legislation under the Water Resources Act (Government of 
NL, 2002) is currently not being implemented locally and it is not always enforced at the 
provincial level.  
 
The lack of the enforcement of SWP is a concern for the municipality, as there are cabins in the 
area as well as related snowmobile and all-terrain vehicle (ATV) activity. Issues related to cabins 
in Steady Brook’s protected water supply area were also noted as concerns in earlier research by 
Minnes (2014) on the municipality. A request to the provincial government by the town to 
purchase and remove the cabins was denied but the town plans to remove these cabins as their 
owners die or cease using them. The interviewee is also concerned about electricity poles 
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covered with wood preserver which, he fears, could leech into the source water. Further research 
showed that the development was permitted under Section 39 of the Water Resource Act 
(Government of NL, 2002) and that the power company agreed to move treated poles to either 
outside of the required buffer zones or to replace those poles within the buffer zone with 
untreated poles (Water Resources Management Division, 2016).  
 
Two town employees are responsible for all outside maintenance, including water operations, 
and have received some training from the provincial government. They check the chlorine 
residual water twice daily as per government requirements.  Steady Brook has been working with 
the provincial government for at least five years on its water problems and received a cost-shared 
grant from the provincial government to dig artesian wells. Like most such grants, this one is a 
90-10 agreement, with the province paying 90% and the community expected to raise 10%. 
However, the total amount –$430,000 – is only half of project estimates received from engineers 
– $860,000 – so progress has stalled. Because of high costs, Steady Brook cannot invest in 
maintenance that would prevent BWAs. It should be noted that Steady Brook is considered to be 
an affluent community, given its place at the foot of Marble Mountain and the site of a ski resort. 
In 2012, the average income in Steady Brook was $51,200 versus $41,400 for the province as a 
whole (Newfoundland & Labrador Statistics Agency, 2012). Arguably, town taxes could be 
raised on this basis but the council is aware of economic disparities within the town and does not 
want to exacerbate these disparities. As an interviewee explained, “There are a lot of people in 
this town who make big money and if they want a big water system and it costs a lot of money 
well (they say) bring it on. . . but if you put your tax bases so high that the little people, the 
widows on a very low income, have to leave their homes and move out because they can’t pay 
taxes, then you’ve done something very, very wrong.” 
 
On the other hand, since the study, the town has made progress on drinking water-related 
conflict, according to recent media reports (CBC Feb. 16, 2016). In early 2016 a new committee 
focused entirely on BWAs was formed. Its first meeting was open and very well-attended. The 
town’s supplier of water treatment equipment was there as were town staff and councilors. “We 
brought everybody into the one room. It was a very crowded room, but nobody could ask a 
question to which there wasn’t an answer,” a councilor told CBC. “Somebody in the room was 
qualified to give an answer. . .people were very receptive of that.” Council also decided to 
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change the maintenance schedule and continue to work on communication issues in the town, 
thus, moving to enhance its human capacity. Other capacity issues, such as financial, remain.     
 
   
Table 2: Regional Economic Information 
 Region A 
(Flat Bay) 
Region B 
(Steady 
Brook) 
Region C 
(Black Tickle) 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
Economic Picture 
Average employment 
income (Year: 2012) 
$28,800 $51,200 $26,900 $41,400 
Employment rate 15 
years and over (Year: 
2011) 
 29% 
 
52.8% 29.3% 50.7% 
Change in employment  
(Year: 2008 to 2012) 
 
0.0% 14.6% -7.4% 1.6% 
Average weeks worked 
15 years and over (Year: 
2010)  
 
30.8 N 30.3 40.7 
Economic Self-Reliance 
Ratio (Year: 2012) 
 
 66.1% 
 
91.3% 69.8% 81.9% 
Low income incidence 
(all family types) (Year: 
2012) 
21.7% N 9.9% 14.2% 
Income support benefits 
incidence (Year: 2013) 
20.2% 1.3% 6.9% 8.4% 
Source: Newfoundland & Labrador Statistics Agency 
                                                   
 
Like many remote northern Indigenous communities, Black Tickle, has no piped water and 
relies on a potable water dispensing unit (PWDU) or Advanced Drinking Water System 
(ADWS). MIGA interviewees see PWDUs as the best example of the multi-barrier approach for 
communities of 500 people or less. The Black Tickle PWDU is located about two kilometres 
from the furthest house and one kilometre from the nearest. Those residents who have all-terrain 
vehicles (ATVs) and/or snowmobiles use these vehicles, with trailers or komatiks (Inuit sleds), to 
retrieve water; the type of vehicle used depends on the season. Mainly for financial reasons, not 
everyone has access to these vehicles. As an interviewee explained, “The other day I was going 
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for a little ride . . . and when I was coming back there was this 67-year-old man carrying two 
buckets from the (PWDU) into Domino by hand. . . I was pretty sad to see that.” 
 
 
Figure 3: Location of Water Dispensing Unit (PWDU) 
Source: Myron King, Environmental Policy Institute, 2016 
The LSD charges user fees for drinking water while unlimited “general use” water is available 
free. The PDWU is inconsistently funded with the result that, at times, residents rely on 
unmonitored water sources, such as brooks and shallow community wells, raising the issue of 
quality.  As in the Nunatsiavut Inuit (Goldhar et al, 2013), preference plays a role here. The LSD 
employs a paid operator in Black Tickle, who works ten hours a week; the operator’s only 
training has been delivered by the previous water operator. The LSD consists of volunteers. 
There is no SWP; Martin’s Pond, the source, is not protected from animal activity or waste, for 
instance. Thus, while the PWDU offers multi-barrier protection, it is far from the only drinking 
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water source for community members with the others being compromised.                  
Black Tickle suffers from frequent drinking water crises, as defined by community leaders. In 
2014, infrastructure problems with the PWDU meant there was no potable water for a week. 
According to an interviewee, “We ran out of filters. What happened was that the water quality 
coming from Martin’s Pond was so poor that instead of filters lasting a month they were lasting a 
day…there was so much sludge and silt and things in the water that we were just chewing up the 
filters. We were going through them faster than we could get them in.  So what happened was 
that we ended up running out of filters and we had to shut the building (PWDU) down until more 
came and during that time people were without water.” Filters lasted two or three days rather 
than the usual one month. Flushing the system was difficult because of freezing weather 
conditions so it was a gradual process.  
 
Vulnerable members of the population were of particular concern to the LSD. Said an 
interviewee, “There was three (people) who required (potable) water to use their concentrators 
and things like that because they’re on oxygen.”  Safe water for baby formulas was also a worry 
for community leadership with all such issues heightened because of the isolation of the 
community and the uncertainty around when the crisis would end. 
 
Residents of Black Tickle sometimes rely on unmonitored water sources such as brooks, some as 
far away as 25km, during drinking water crises. They also used shallow wells that are, in keeping 
with Inuit culture, shared and not privately owned. An interviewee mentioned that, “Some people 
went into the bay; Porcupine Bay like there’s a run off in there… Other people just used the 
water that was in the brooks and ponds here and boiled it. Some people just drank it straight from 
the brooks and ponds.” Another strategy used is to minimize drinking water consumption, which 
has health impacts. Bottled water is not consistently available in the community and is beyond 
the financial means of most households as a regular drinking water source.  
During the 2014 crisis residents contacted the media, which reported on the crisis, triggering a 
phone call and offer of assistance from the former Department of Labrador and Aboriginal 
Affairs (LAA) in Happy Valley-Goose Bay. Thus, a horizontal linkage resulted in a vertical 
linkage. The call to the LSD came from the minister’s executive assistant and led to a short-term 
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resolution of the crisis. LAA initiated a response from MIGA and the Red Cross until new filters 
could arrive, rushed by the provincial government. No one from any agency visited the 
community during the crisis. But an interviewee concluded, “If anything it (the crisis) was a 
good impact because we realized that we could definitely depend on the Department of 
Municipal Affairs.  It was really good to know that they were really quick acting like that.” 
Except for the media, linkages between Black Tickle and other agencies were not well-developed 
at the time of the 2014 water crisis. As an interviewee explained, “We were just new coming on 
to the committee so we weren’t really sure like what steps we were supposed to have taken.” 
There is considerable turn-over in volunteers who serve on the LSD. There appears to have been 
almost no vertical linkage to the provincial government at the time of the crisis. This crisis 
changed this temporarily in that LAA offered to help with any further crises and, as seen above, 
community leaders came to see MIGA as a reliable resource. This is true even though the origin 
of the problem was not a source water quantity problem but equipment-related. However, there 
has been a change of government since the crisis with LAA becoming an office under Executive 
Council. There has also been a change in staff, meaning that the community has lost its new 
provincial government contacts.  
 
It is not obvious to community members living in a remote area how to proceed should another 
crisis occur. This is a likelihood given the irregular funding of the PWDU and other factors. 
There have been times the PWDU has not been operational because of lack of funding. The 
community’s crab processing plant, its main employer, closed several years ago, causing 
widespread unemployment, so the LSD cannot raise the required annual operational funding 
required: $30,000. Yet the province considers water infrastructure to be a community 
responsibility. Each year Black Tickle applies for so-called one-time grants to fund its PWDU; in 
recent years these applications have been successful but there is a great deal of uncertainty and 
stress around the process as well as a culture of water insecurity and a perception of injustice, 
considering there is no piped water. Said an interviewee, “I just think there needs to be a more 
giving hand when it comes to money for improvements and training and operations of the 
systems. We had to fight like tooth and nail to get the money the last time. I think it’s a bit 
ridiculous when you think about the fact that it’s water and it’s a basic need and it’s a basic right. 
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I don’t think that we should have to submit these proposals every year. It should be carried over 
from one year to the next unless something happened. I mean why would you have to beg for 
water?” 
 
Black Tickle is one of many Indigenous communities in Canada in which drinking water crises 
have become the norm. Part of the problem is scale and inappropriate technology, a common 
occurrence in Indigenous communities in Canada where there is an ongoing practice of bringing 
high cost drinking water units to small population bases (Patrick, 2011). Thus, communities are 
left to deal with inappropriate design specifications, dependency on chemical treatment, lack of 
trained operators, and high operation and maintenance costs with increased human vulnerability 
resulting from technology failure (Patrick, 2011). Black Tickle’s story clearly demonstrates how 
necessary it is to consider the four DWS components ̶ access, availability, quality and preference ̶ 
to ensure water security. Had preference and local knowledge been considered, a more 
appropriate scale solution than the existing PWDU might have been instituted in 2004. Despite 
the active lobbying of its Concerned Citizens Committee at the time, the people of Black Tickle 
were never consulted about the location and scale of the PWDU. As Goldhar et al. point out, a 
key step in advancing genuine water security involves adequately adapting technologies to meet 
local environmental demands; otherwise, the drinking water produced may be “undesirable” to 
residents and of “little use” (2013, 480-481). This has been borne out in the case of Black Tickle. 
 
6.0 DISCUSSION  
 
6.1 Capacity 
 
Similar to many communities worldwide (Timmer et al., 2007), the study communities all face 
significant capacity challenges. In terms of human capacity, these include education and training 
of water operators, especially in the case of Black Tickle, and access to expertise, also a critical 
issue for Black Tickle, but a problem for Steady Brook as well in terms of its BWAs.  
 
Institutional capacity problems include limited ability to establish and/or implement SWP 
measures and raise revenue for upgrades, repairs and/or operations; this is, again, especially true 
of Black Tickle but we note that Steady Brook experiences similar frustrations and that Flat Bay 
27 
 
West-Birchy Bay Water Committee had a great deal of difficulty garnering its portion (10%) of 
provincial cost-share grants. In this respect, there are contradictory messages from government. 
On the one hand, there is some stated understanding of the importance of good governance to 
drinking water security: “The challenges are that communities don’t have good governance (and) 
they have insufficient staff and declining populations.” This, too, is a consideration of 
government’s: “All parties need to work together to have resources to sustain good local 
governance. There is a need to recognize the role of volunteers and the associated problems, 
which won’t sustain communities’ water system. Regional governance is the key. And 
communities need better local governance. Pouring money into it cannot always work. It is 
necessary to make local governance strong to deal with water management.” As the study 
demonstrates, a great deal is expected of communities – and volunteers. Some government 
officials in this study believe that communities can sustain themselves if they charge adequate 
taxes or fees. Steady Brook has indicated it will not raise taxes because of potential impacts on 
its low-income residents. Black Tickle is particularly disadvantaged because of its economic 
conditions. Further, there appears to be a worrying commitment to the move from government to 
governance. This does not appear to offer drinking water solutions to small rural communities, 
especially when not met with adequate capacity building at the local level in order to implement 
new responsibilities.  
 
6.2 Volunteer Labour 
 
In Flat Bay, volunteers have a history of identifying water problems and solutions, lobbying for 
improvements, communicating with local people, acquiring equipment, fund-raising, 
constructing buildings, and monitoring the water supply. One volunteer spent 200 hours on water 
issues in the summer of 2014 during a crisis (interview). Said one interviewee, “If we don’t do it, 
who’s gonna do it? It will fall down around us.” This comment demonstrates the effect of the 
shift from government to governance on drinking water management. 
 
The dependence on volunteer labour raises several concerns for communities, especially since 
water security and other burdens tend to fall to a small number of volunteers. In addition, the 
pool of volunteers is small as all the study communities are aging as illustrated in Table 1.  Other 
concerns include potential liability problems and the likelihood of volunteer burn-out and 
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inadequate succession planning. Though regional approaches would not aid remote communities 
such as Black-Tickle, it could be a solution for other communities such as Steady Brook. An 
example of a promising initiative at the provincial level, which Flat Bay is currently a part of, is 
the regional water and wastewater operator pilot program. This program has given support for 
three full-time regional operators in the eastern, western and central regions. This ensures that 
nearly 40 communities now share in the benefits of a certified operator overseeing their systems. 
This benefits low capacity rural communities greatly, such as those in the Western region who all 
share one regional operator. These towns include: Rose Blanche – Harbour Le Cou, Isle aux 
Morts, Fox Roost – Margaree, Burnt Islands, Ship Cove – Lower Cove – Jerry’s Nose, Piccadilly 
Head, Piccadilly Slant – Abrahams Cove, West Bay, Sheaves Cove, Flat Bay West, Flat Bay 
East and Black Duck Siding. Hopefully this program will benefit the town of Flat Bay West and 
reduces their susceptibility to future drinking water crises.  
 
6.3 Source Water Protection 
 
SWP is necessary for safe drinking water (Timmer et al., 2007) yet only one of the three 
communities in this study  ̶   Flat Bay  ̶  indicated they are currently implementing SWP 
practices. Both Black Tickle and Steady Brook are aware that the absence of SWP is a problem, 
a potentially critical one. Yet SWP requires capacity to finance, plan, coordinate and implement 
technical and expensive measures (Timmer et al., 2007). In common with many communities 
globally (Timmer et al., 2007), the study communities lack such capacity in varying degrees. In 
the case of Steady Brook, it seems, implementation has been a challenge at both the local and 
provincial levels. 
 
For financial, cultural and political reasons, many municipalities and LSDs in this province have 
limited capacity to raise levies. Raising levies works best in an environment of larger rate-payer 
bases (Robins, 2007, 14); in this province, there are such few examples outside St. John’s, Mount 
Pearl and other cities and large towns. Further, the current reliance on volunteers is not 
sustainable and can work only in heavily populated regions (Robins, 2007, 14). In addition, there 
may be liability issues; this study found that liability is something communities have not 
considered. 
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6.4 Community Linkages and Regionalization 
 
Communities can receive advice from the provincial government and thus take advantage of 
expertise there for long-term planning but this does not always happen. According to one 
government official, some communities have built water treatment plants that are larger than 
necessary. He adds: “Their operational costs are going to be significantly higher than (they) need 
based on current population and population projections. So you need to invest some money first 
to control your leaks and then build a treatment plant of the appropriate size to need to meet your 
water demand.  So we’re trying to steer a lot of communities to undertake the right approach.” 
He concluded, expressing a problem from government’s perspective: “We can’t tell a community 
what to do . . .we might identify a very effective solution for them but if they don’t consider it a 
priority then they’re not going to make a request for funding to do what needs to be done.”  
 
According to this official, water management would run more smoothly if communities 
prioritized it as they do roads and other infrastructure such as municipal buildings. In 2015, only 
a tiny fraction of the responses to MIGA’s call for applications for infrastructure improvements 
related to drinking water. It is possible that communities do not understand they could apply for 
drinking water improvements through this call. This could be remedied through incentives, such 
as more favourable cost-share arrangements, or through requirements, such as making 
communities ineligible for other funding if their BWAs are not addressed.  
 
This study revealed that, for drinking water management, rural communities in NL rely on both 
horizontal and vertical linkages to a high degree; this reliance is exaggerated because of limited 
capacity at the community level and remoteness in the case of Black Tickle. In this province, the 
media plays an important role as a horizontal linkage. In the Maritime provinces, regionalization 
has been viewed as at least a partial solution to some of the problems cited here (Kot et al., 2011; 
Bakker and Cook, 2011). Increased information and resource sharing can offer rural 
communities greater leverage (Kot et al., 2011). Regional efforts can be challenging for 
extremely remote communities like Black Tickle but not impossible, especially if the 
geographical and cultural experience and greater capacity of NCC is utilized. At the community 
level, a push towards regionalization is more likely when a majority of communities perceive 
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high problem severity such that degradation is severe, obvious, and negatively affects their 
ability to maximize self-defined goals (Memon and Waber, 2010). 
 
6.5 New Government Initiatives 
In this province, both government and communities recognize how capacity limitations at the 
community level hamper the achievement of drinking water goals. Accordingly, MIGA has 
launched a pilot project under its Integrated Community Sustainability Plan (ICSP) initiative. 
According to the department, “In its most basic form an ICSP is a long-term strategic plan that 
should encompass most aspects of municipal planning. Integrated Community Sustainability 
Plans means a long-term plan, developed in consultation with community members, that 
provides direction for the cities, towns and regions to realize sustainability objectives it has for 
the environmental, cultural, social, economic and governance dimensions of its identity”. For 
municipalities, ICSPs were a requirement of the Gas Tax Agreement (GTA). The pilot project 
involved hiring water specialists on a regional basis and was in progress at the time of this study. 
As a government official pointed out to us, remote communities like Black Tickle will not be 
able to access regional water operators, although it is possible that other communities will 
benefit from this approach. 
The Maintenance Assurance Manual (MAM) is a new provincial government initiative, 
developed by MIGA initially, that aims to advance the multi-barrier approach through advancing 
human capacity. The MAM was in the development phase at the time of the study. As a 
government interviewee explained, “(The manual will) deal with situations on a case by case 
basis. It serves as a tool to monitor and support drinking water operators to maintain water 
systems as well as apply for a possible funding. It will assist communities to maintain water 
systems on their own by including such features as water consumption log templates.” MAMs 
could potentially address some of the concerns about liability as the manual emphasizes best 
practices related to preventative maintenance of infrastructure. MA planned to educate and 
circulate the manual templates to communities. The problem however, is that at the time of this 
research, though the templates are available, no resources are available to help communities to 
complete their MAMs, such as a guidance document. 
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7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
7.1 Conclusion  
 
It is clear from the study that communities in rural Newfoundland and Labrador face drinking 
water crises, which even though there is no standard definition for what constitutes a water crisis. 
All three communities have faced at least one of these categories of water crises including 
contamination, infrastructure, water shortages and weather. Secondly, the provincial government 
does not have conservation plans in place for water management and deals with drinking water 
crises on a case by case basis. Finally, only one of the study communities - Flat Bay  ̶  has  
consistently implemented SWP. 
 
These issues are attributed to the limited decentralized water systems of the province. 
Decentralization does not adequately respond to any of the dimensions of DWS: access, 
availability, quality or preference. Nor does it operate from the perspective of water security as a 
right. The central problems are local capacity and financial resources. Limited local capacity 
means that local governments might be less proactive in protecting drinking water sources and 
instead make unwise decisions, such as investing in inappropriate technologies. With limited 
capacities to manage drinking water systems in the province, the contributions of volunteers 
cannot be underrated. However, the current reliance on volunteers is problematic and can work 
only in heavily populated regions where there are a lot of options in terms of individuals with the 
requisite expertise to work on drinking water systems. In rural communities, such as those 
outlined in this report, the number of volunteers is often limited and volunteers are highly 
susceptible to burnout.  
 
The provision and access of safe drinking water is a right and should require different 
approaches to its management. These approaches involve looking at all areas of safe drinking 
water provision and management and clearly putting in place measures to ensure that there is no 
deficiency in any of these areas. Such measures should not just ensure that responses are 
provided only when there is drinking water crisis but that there is committed emphasis on the 
prevention of such crises. One promising development in this area is ENVC’s development of a 
new SWP toolbox for BWAs that has been successfully piloted in Portugal Cove South on the 
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Avalon Peninsula; prior to the project, the community had been on a BWA for 28 years (Dawe, 
2016).  
 
7.2 Recommendations 
We make the following recommendations to advance drinking water crisis prevention in an 
attempt to shift the focus from crisis response. 
 
For the provincial government: 
1. Establish a broader definition of water crisis: The provincial government should not 
only see challenges with the source water as the only drinking water crisis criterion 
but also include issues relating to contamination, infrastructure, water shortages, 
weather, and aesthetic issues like taste, smell and appearance. The broader definition 
should also take into consideration factors that determine whether a particular 
instance relates to drinking water crisis including duration, funding required and the 
extent of effects from such challenge(s). 
2. Develop a comprehensive water management plan for the entire province, created 
collaboratively meaningfully engaging local level government, residents, academics, 
non-governmental organizations and apex organizations such as Municipalities 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
3. Create community- or region-specific water emergency preparedness plans that focus 
on preventative actions. Such plans are necessary to ensure that rural drinking water 
needs are met. It would also ensure that drinking water systems, including 
infrastructure, are adequately monitored and evaluated so that needs are met and 
crises, prevented. Such emergency preparedness plans could be incorporated into 
existing Maintenance Assurance Manual creation efforts.  
4. Recognize that decentralization cannot work unless local organizations have 
sufficient resources. Such resources should include financial resources to train and 
pay operators as well as education and training for the implementation of source 
water protection stewardship and monitoring efforts. Access to drinking water is a 
basic right and its provision and management should not be left in the hands of 
volunteers, especially as the stakes are so high in terms of health.  
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For municipalities and LSDs:  
5. Recognize the importance of the development of horizontal linkages, which can serve 
as advocates for resolving drinking water crises. This is especially true of 
communities without businesses and other influential voices. Rural communities 
should work with media and civil society to channel their drinking water challenges 
and push for long term solutions to such challenges. 
6. Recognize the importance of vertical linkages. The provincial government, especially 
ENVC and MIGA (now MA) should be viewed as a resource and a source of 
expertise that can advance drinking water goals. 
7. Prioritize DWS improvements over other infrastructure improvements; in other 
words, request these improvements in response to MIGA’s annual call for 
infrastructure improvements. 
 
For the provincial government and communities: 
 
8. Communities should be consulted about their particular situations and their need to 
participate in drinking water management. This includes putting in place water 
management committees in each rural community to serve liaison, education and 
advocacy roles. These committees should all interact with provincial, regional and 
local actors (e.g., residents). This would promote better community-level 
understanding of drinking water management and issues and related community 
responsibilities, such as avoiding activity around source waters and their role in 
monitoring and protecting their watersheds.  
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix I: Interview Guide for Communities 
1. Who/ which organization is in charge of or leads community governance?  
2. Who/which organization is responsible for the community water system? 
3. Does the community receive regular and stable funding for its water system? 
4. What education/training has been given to the community about its water supply? 
5. What is the population in your community? 
6. How many households does the community have? 
7. What is the average household size? 
8. Is the community aging or is there a good distribution of all ages? 
9. Can you describe the local economy? (What do most people do for living? What is the 
unemployment rate? Do people work away?) 
10. Are there any vulnerable groups within the population that might have special needs or 
requirements?  
11. What are the community’s transportation links?  
12. What other infrastructure does the community have (e.g. school, clinic)? 
 
SECTION B - The Community Water System: 
1. Please describe the community’s water system, including treatment systems and distribution. 
2. What is the source of the community water supply? (e.g. Ground water, spring water, 
surface water, etc. ) 
3. What human activities take place around the main water sources?  
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4. Are there any protection measures around the main water sources? (e.g. Fencing) 
5. Are there seasonal or weather variations that impact water quality and quantity? 
6. Is water quality monitored? How? How often? Where? 
7. Is the water distribution system simple and easy to control? 
8. Are treatment plant operators trained? 
9. Are the storage tanks protected? (e.g. Rainproof, locked gates) 
10. Does the water system/infrastructure work in good condition? 
11. What construction materials are used in the infrastructure, and how old is the infrastructure? 
12. What is the average pressure in the system, and does it vary? 
13. How is wastewater handled? 
SECTION C - Descriptions of Water Crisis: 
1. How did the water crisis happen? What caused it? 
2. When did you realize it was a problem that needed immediate action?  
       - In what circumstances? 
3. Does the community have a water crisis response plan? 
4. How did the community respond? (What did you do? What steps did you take?) 
5. What were the options available to the community to deal with the crisis? 
6. Were there allies or resource people in the community could call on during the crisis?  
       - If so, what was their role? 
7. How were residents notified about the water issue? 
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8. Were you able to obtain drinking water?  
    - How was water distributed to the community during the crisis?  
See Q6.  
9. Was the amount of available drinking water adequate? 
    - How much water was distributed per person per day during the crisis?  
10. What were your ongoing concerns during the water crisis? 
11. How long did the water crisis last?  
12. Did the water shortage result in any long-term impacts on the community?  
SECTION D - Community and Government: 
1. How did the provincial or federal government respond? What did they do?  
2. What steps did they take? 
3. Did they have a response plan? 
 What options or alternatives were presented to the community?  
4. Did the government declare state of emergency/ issue any orders/alerts? 
5. Did the government launch any monitoring programs during the crisis or to follow up? 
6. Did the government hold any public meetings after the crisis soliciting opinions? 
7. How did government communicate with you before/ after the crisis? 
8. Can you comment on government’s water crisis responses?  
9. Is there a response plan in case of water crisis (shortage /contamination) in your community? 
10. Do you have suggestions to improve government responses to water crises?  
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Appendix II:  Interview Questions for Government Officials 
 
1. Does the NL government have any water crisis response plans or procedures?  
- Please describe the principles behind these plans. 
- Please describe the plans and procedures themselves? 
2. Some communities in NL have experienced water shortages. Can you describe the 
government’s responses to these situations? Are there any guidelines for the required amount 
of water for using during an emergency? 
3. How do you manage emergencies in a decentralized water supply system? Any established 
protocols and existing organizations?  
4. Do departments share responsibilities in planning for or responding to water crises? If yes, 
how? 
5. How do interdepartmental communications work in an emergency?  
6. Are there successful cases of interdepartmental emergency coordination? 
7. Traditional responses to water shortages here and throughout North America tend to 
concentrate measures on reducing water demand and providing short-term water supplies but 
overlooking long-term solutions. Is this a fair assessment? Can you comment on it?  
8. Has the government implemented any long-term conservation plan for communities with 
frequent water shortages? Or more generally? 
9. Has the NL government launched any initiatives that are aimed at enhancing the capacity of 
small water systems?  
10. What is the role of communities in water crises?  
11. How can the multi-barrier approach be implemented at the community level?  
12. Are any other policy options being considered?  
13. What is the government’s regional planning process for water crisis response? 
14. What are the challenges that government faces? Can you identify any tradeoff decisions? 
15. Can you give us some description of technical specialists who work with the community 
water system? What is their scope of practice? 
16. Do NGOs have a role to play here? If so, can you describe that role? 
17. Do you have suggestions or comments that haven’t been covered? 
